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Introduction and summary
In 2010, Congress enacted two major expansions to the social safety net. First, it 
passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, more commonly known 
as the ACA.1 This bill brought sweeping changes to the American system of health 
care. In particular, it provided new money for states to expand health care cover-
age to extremely low-income people and tax credits to help individuals purchase 
insurance plans. A week later, President Barack Obama signed the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.2 That legislation included more than 
$36 billion in new money for the federal Pell Grant program, which helps low-
income students afford college.3 It also indexed the maximum Pell Grant award to 
inflation, guaranteeing benefits would increase each year. 
The ultimate goals of both the health care and education expansions were simi-
lar: make an important set of benefits—health insurance in one case, college in 
the other—affordable for vulnerable populations. More than five years later, the 
effects of both changes are clear. 
Thanks to the ACA, the share of Americans who lack health insurance has 
dropped by about one-third and is now at a historic low.4 This includes decreases 
in the uninsured rate in every state in the country and the District of Columbia.5 
Millions more still need coverage, but the numbers appear to be headed in the 
right direction. 
The legislation accomplished this by setting clear expectations that Americans 
should have health insurance and that it should be affordable. It set a goal for 
states to expand Medicaid—the program that provides coverage for low-income 
families—to everyone at or below a set threshold tied to the poverty level. It also 
created a new set of tax credits that established clear benchmarks for both how 
much people should have to pay out of pocket for health care coverage and what 
type of insurance they should be able to afford. These benefit structures provided 
a degree of certainty for families in what had previously been a chaotic market.
2 Center for American Progress | The Case for Federal Higher Education Affordability Standards
Meanwhile, the investments made in Pell Grants significantly raised the maximum 
award and number of recipients. This year, students can receive up to $5,775 
through the program, an increase from $4,731 in 2008.6 Similarly, the number of 
recipients grew from slightly more than 6 million to more than 8 million.7 
While the Pell Grant increases have meant a lot for students, they have only held 
the line on college affordability for low-income individuals, not made it better. 
Today, the Pell Grant covers 30 percent of the total cost of attending a four-year 
public college.8 In 2008, it covered 32 percent.9 Similarly, the borrowing rate of 
Pell Grant recipients stayed unchanged at 70 percent from 2008 to 2012.10 
The differing federal approaches to affordability partially explain why the 
expansion of Pell Grants was less successful in helping low-income students 
than the ACA was in raising the share of Americans with health care. Unlike 
with the ACA, the increase in Pell Grants did not come with guarantees that 
recipients would not pay more than a set percentage of their income or borrow 
no more than a set amount of money. The increased Pell Grant benefits boosted 
the maximum possible award by about $1,000, giving students more money to 
spend on college expenses. 
The result of an expectation-light approach to college affordability is that the 
ability of federal postsecondary benefits to achieve their desired aims is com-
pletely dependent upon the choices made by schools, governors, and legisla-
tures across the country. In California community colleges, for example, where 
prices are low or nonexistent for most attendees, the federal benefits are more 
than enough to cover tuition and can also put a dent in living expenses. But 
in a more expensive state such as New Hampshire, federal grants and loans 
combined may not be enough to even pay for direct academic costs. And there 
is no guarantee the places where federal aid currently is sufficient will stay that 
way—a few lean years could easily result in California community colleges 
becoming much less affordable. 
Such a situation is simply unsustainable. The federal government is making too 
large an investment in postsecondary education to see its dollars not guarantee 
affordability, simplicity, and certainty for students. To combat this, we need to 
flip the concept of federal postsecondary assistance to focus on what it buys, not 
how much it pays. 
We need to flip  
the concept 
of federal 
postsecondary 
assistance to  
focus on what  
it buys, not how 
much it pays. 
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As this report shows, changing federal financial aid benefits to guarantee recipi-
ents can purchase a specific set of goods, not just receive a set amount of money, 
will better conform these programs to the rest of the U.S. social safety net. 
Drawing on examples from the health care and housing sectors, this report ana-
lyzes how the federal government addresses the question of affordability through 
the benefits provided to consumers. In particular, it focuses on two programs 
within each area: Medicaid and the ACA in health care and rental housing assis-
tance and federally insured mortgages in housing. Importantly, this emphasis on 
the benefits to consumers intentionally excludes other questions about how the 
federal government could contain costs, such as through innovation. That is an 
important area for future research. 
Examining how the federal government addresses affordability in other key policy 
areas shows five lessons for how the government could rethink its higher educa-
tion benefits to better meet its goals. The most important of these findings is that 
benefits should be tied to specific purchasing goals for consumers. By benchmark-
ing benefits to a stated end goal—such as affording a postsecondary education—
federal assistance would provide greater assurance that those who are getting help 
will be able to afford at least a basic level of education. 
Other lessons from health care and housing provide important information for 
restructuring federal aid for postsecondary education. These include: 
• Minimizing expenses for the lowest-income individuals 
• Setting limits for what level of goods the federal government will make 
affordable 
• Creating separate affordability standards for debt
• Sharing the cost of achieving affordability beyond the federal government 
While there is much to be learned about college affordability from other sectors, 
these health care and housing programs are not perfect. They may not serve enough 
eligible individuals; they may use a benchmark that does not feel sufficiently afford-
able to consumers; or they may have other challenges. To that end, these programs 
highlight four other lessons about the challenges in addressing affordability: 
• Unavailability undermines affordability
• Affordability must tackle all cost elements
• Benchmarks must have face validity
• Providers that meet affordability standards may change 
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Based on these lessons, this report suggests a new framework for postsecondary 
affordability. It starts with guaranteeing a low- to no-cost education for the most vul-
nerable individuals. As students move higher up the income spectrum, the guarantee 
shifts to ensure they can afford at least an in-state public option without paying more 
than a reasonable share of their income. To make the math work, states and institu-
tions would have to provide enough assistance to fill in any gaps that exist between 
family contributions and federal funds. Recognizing that such clear-cut affordability 
aims may not be feasible at private institutions, these schools would instead have to 
keep students’ debts below certain levels that are tied to postgraduate earnings. 
Setting explicit goals and guarantees for federal student aid recipients highlights that 
these investments are the most credible tools for addressing affordability. As the larg-
est single funder of college education in the country, the federal government could 
and should use its aid to demand that the beneficiaries of its assistance are guaranteed 
access to affordable educations. This vision of a student aid program actively engaged 
in requiring affordability is also an explicit rejection of the theory first articulated 
by former U.S. Secretary of Education William J. Bennett that these programs are to 
blame for never-ending price increases.11 Rather than enabling colleges to raise prices 
to capture more money, as the Bennett Hypothesis articulates, this vision allows the 
federal government to exert its leverage to keep prices affordable and in check.
While this paper represents its own vision for achieving postsecondary affordabil-
ity through federal action, it builds upon other thinking about the need for greater 
clarity about what families should pay for college. In particular, it draws on concepts 
first discussed by the Lumina Foundation—a funder of the Center for American 
Progress Postsecondary Education team—in its 2015 benchmark for higher educa-
tion affordability.12 Though nonbinding, the benchmark argues that families should 
be able to afford college through contributions from savings, income, and student 
work. This paper takes such a concept even further by proposing how the federal 
government could create a binding affordability requirement. 
The need for a new approach to higher education benefits is clear. Today, more than 
41 million Americans currently hold a combined $1.2 trillion in federal student 
debt, including 7.5 million borrowers in default.13 States continue to reduce spend-
ing on their public institutions of higher education, driving up tuition and debt. 
Additionally, family incomes simply cannot keep up with prices that grow faster 
than inflation year after year. And this does not even begin to address the persistent 
access and completion gaps by race and income. Only by taking a new approach to 
these benefits—one that builds on lessons learned from other policy areas—can 
the federal government hope to guarantee that all students, regardless of back-
ground, can access and afford postsecondary education.
The federal 
government could 
and should use its 
aid to demand that 
the beneficiaries 
of its assistance 
are guaranteed 
access to affordable 
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The goal and structure  
of federal financial aid
Federal financial aid is a long-term investment that, if effective, should help 
students move up the socioeconomic ladder over time. This time frame for suc-
cess is slightly different from other federal benefits, such as housing assistance or 
health insurance, which are designed to immediately improve or stabilize the lives 
of families. This difference also explains why federal financial aid benefits differ 
somewhat from those provided for health insurance and housing. With the excep-
tion of mortgage assistance, the other major benefit programs provide just-in-time 
cash transfers or other types of assistance that do not have to be repaid. Federal 
college aid includes grants but also relies heavily on student loans. The idea 
behind these debts is that students borrow against the future increases in income 
they will receive from earning a degree. 
But even if the investment horizons and structures are different, the federal gov-
ernment’s college aid programs still have the same ultimate goals as funds spent in 
other sectors such as health care and housing. The government wants its support 
for postsecondary education to allow recipients to afford a college education. 
These funds should supplement gaps in the financing landscape that would other-
wise prevent students from going to college. And for the lowest-income students, 
federal grant aid should minimize or obviate the need to borrow. 
To accomplish these goals, Congress sets a maximum level of grants and loans that 
a student can receive each year. These amounts are not small—this year, the largest 
Pell Grant for low-income students is $5,775, and Stafford Loans for first-year stu-
dents range from $5,500 to $9,500. The exact funds students are eligible to receive 
vary depending on a number of factors, including students’ economic situation, the 
number of credits they attempt, their year in college, and the cost of their institution. 
Notably, the major federal financial aid programs operate as vouchers for students. 
Dollars are disbursed to colleges on behalf of students, meaning that the amount of 
federal support an institution receives is directly related to the number of enrolled 
students who are receiving this aid. Pell Grants and Stafford Loans contain no 
matching requirements and no additional funds for enrolling large numbers of 
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students who receive these forms of aid. The other effect of the voucher distribution 
model is that state governments never receive any money from the aid programs. 
State governments are not expected to play any formal operational role in the system 
beyond approving institutions to operate within their borders. 
Despite their size, the federal financial aid programs’ purchasing power is decreas-
ing over time. Today, the maximum Pell Grant covers just 30 percent of the total 
cost of attending a public four-year college versus 77 percent in 1980.14 While 
some of this drop is due to years when the maximum Pell Grant did not increase, 
even indexing the award to inflation from its inception in the 1970s would not be 
enough to overcome the relentless increase in college prices.15 As a result of this 
decline in purchasing power in the 2011-12 academic year, 70 percent of Pell Grant 
students at public four-year colleges also had to borrow to pay for their education.16 
The reason behind the decline in federal purchasing power also matters for under-
standing what can be done to address it. Federal benefits’ values fall not because 
institutions are raising prices just to capture more federal money. Instead, states are 
intentionally reducing their support for postsecondary education. According to a 
Center for American Progress analysis, 38 states cut their funding per student by at 
least 5 percent from 2008 to 2012.17 When faced with budgetary holes from state 
cuts, institutions are forced to raise prices for students. The result is that educational 
costs that used to be borne by states are now being passed on to students who then 
turn to federal student aid to pay them. Absent the presence of federal benefits, stu-
dents and families would find themselves with completely unattainable tuition bills. 
States supplanting their own funding for student and federal support is not a 
good outcome. This is particularly true because a lot of the federal benefits come 
as loans that must be repaid by the students—raising their long-term costs and 
resulting in bad financial conditions if they cannot make their loan payments. 
Reversing the decline in the purchasing power of federal postsecondary benefits 
and improving affordability cannot be done with simple tweaks to the programs. 
Nor will increasing benefits alone be enough—the rate at which tuition rises is 
simply too great. Instead, if the federal government wants to ensure that its higher 
education programs truly improve affordability, it needs to look to the lessons 
learned from other sectors about how to address these problems. Investigating 
how major federal programs in areas such as health care and housing tackle the 
challenges of affordability can highlight other practices that would be good to 
adopt in higher education. It can also show the challenges of different approaches 
and give a sense of potential pitfalls. 
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Affordability lessons  
from other sectors
Reviewing how the federal government approaches affordability in other sectors 
reveals five positive lessons that could be applied to higher education financing:
• Many other programs tie benefit amounts to defined benchmarks so recipients 
know they will receive enough aid to purchase the goods they need. 
• Areas such as health care set distinct affordability policies for the most vulnerable 
individuals that result in minimal to no expectations for out-of-pocket spending. 
• The federal government also limits which products within a market it will make 
affordable, refusing to subsidize the priciest options. 
• Related to this sense of limits, the federal government also creates affordability 
standards—specifically, when it deals with debt in areas related to housing—to 
protect consumers from unaffordable payments. 
• Finally, the federal government does not always pursue affordability on its 
own. For crucial items such as health insurance, it enlists the help of states and 
employers to achieve its aims. 
Not all the lessons learned about approaching affordability are positive. Many 
of the programs profiled here have their own challenges that make them less 
effective at promoting affordability. In acknowledging these limitations, this 
report identifies four problems in other sectors that any efforts to change federal 
student aid benefits must recognize:
• Available resources must be sufficient to avoid rationing support or tying goals to 
outdated standards that do not reflect the amount of help needed in today’s world. 
• Affordability often matters on multiple dimensions in a given sector that must be 
addressed. For example, making monthly premiums affordable in health insurance 
may not be enough if the copays are too expensive for people to visit the doctor. 
• Expectations for out-of-pocket spending must feel reasonable to recipients. 
• One challenge in attaching benefits to specific levels of quality is the options 
that meet this standard might change over time. For instance, the ACA provides 
tax credits for health insurance plans that meet certain cost conditions. But the 
plans that qualify for this benefit may change over time. 
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The next sections describe each of these nine lessons—five positive and four nega-
tive—in greater detail, with specific examples from health care and housing and 
an explanation of how they might relate to higher education benefits. 
Lesson #1: Tying federal benefits to specific affordability 
benchmarks helps guarantee purchasing power 
In higher education, federal benefits are calculated in terms of dollars with no con-
sideration for what those funds can buy. By contrast, federal programs for health 
care and housing focus on providing enough assistance to bridge the gap families 
face between the price of the product and what the families can afford to pay. This 
approach ensures that federal support theoretically gives families enough purchas-
ing power to buy what they need. 
How federal financial aid calculates benefits
Here is how the aid awarding process works in higher education: When stu-
dents complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid, or FAFSA, they 
are presented with a figure, known as an Expected Family Contribution, or EFC. 
Theoretically, the EFC is a ballpark estimation of what a family can be reasonably 
expected to pay for college. This number can range anywhere from $0 to tens of 
thousands of dollars, depending on a family’s income and assets. 
The EFC also drives how much federal aid students receive. For instance, the 
maximum Pell Grant students can receive in a given year is equal to the difference 
between the maximum award and their EFC. In other words, if the maximum award 
is $5,915, then a student with an EFC of $0 can receive up to $5,915, while someone 
with an EFC of $1,250 would qualify for up to $4,665. The EFC also matters for 
receiving Subsidized Stafford Loans. It is not, however, relevant for Unsubsidized 
Stafford Loans, which are available to anyone regardless of EFC or income. 
The use of the EFC in the aid awarding process suggests that affordability can 
be accomplished by combining family contributions and any necessary grant or 
loan aid. In fact, the Higher Education Act itself establishes this idea, noting in 
Section 401 that the combination of a reasonable family contribution, the Pell 
Grant, and other small federal assistance programs should cover 75 percent of 
the cost of a higher education.18 
9 Center for American Progress | The Case for Federal Higher Education Affordability Standards
In practice, the sum of EFC and other aid rarely adds up to affordability for 
lower-income students. The problem is that the EFC is a nonbinding number. 
Institutions of higher education are under no obligation to honor that figure and 
charge students anything close to it. A student with a $0 expected contribution 
could end up still paying tens of thousands of dollars per year for college. In fact, 
27 percent of these individuals who attend full time pay $5,000 or more just for 
their tuition and fees, including 13 percent at public four-year colleges.19 Including 
living expenses, 86 percent of full-time students with a $0 EFC are paying at least 
$5,000 for college—including 89 percent at public four-year institutions.20
Without a binding EFC figure, federal education benefits only ensure recipients 
will get a specific dollar level of support. For instance, maximum Pell Grant 
recipients in their first year of college know that they will receive up to $5,915, and 
they can get a loan of up to $5,500 if they are still supported by their family.21 But 
what recipients lack is any guarantee that those dollars will be sufficient to actually 
purchase the postsecondary education they are supposed to afford. 
Thus, how far students’ federal dollars stretch depends on where they live and 
what type of school they attend. For students who live in states such as Florida or 
California, which traditionally have reasonably priced higher education, federal 
support may cover all or most of their costs. By contrast, someone with the exact 
same financial situation in New Hampshire or other states that typically have very 
high college prices may have a much harder time affording college.22 And in both 
cases, the federal government allows states and institutions to choose whether to 
offer affordable postsecondary options. 
This approach to benefits, solely in dollar terms and without considering what the 
funds should actually buy, is distinct from how other federal programs consider 
affordability. In other programs, such as the health care tax credits authorized 
under the ACA or federal rental assistance, benefits are attached to specific prices 
consumers face, ensuring that dollars will be sufficient to meet their intended 
aims. Doing so provides certainty for the recipients—who know they will be able 
to actually buy health insurance or rent an apartment with the aid. It also helps the 
federal government—which knows its aid can actually achieve its desired goals. 
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How the ACA calculates benefits
The health insurance tax credits created by the ACA illustrate a way of thinking 
about benefits in terms of being enough to specifically afford a product instead 
of just being a set dollar amount. The goal of these credits is to provide subsidies 
for low- and moderate-income individuals who receive either no or insufficient 
employer coverage to purchase health insurance on the individual market.23 But to 
work, subsidies have to be large enough to bring the level of plans on the market 
down to a price people can actually afford. To accomplish this goal, the federal 
government sets the credit amount at the difference between the cost of a specific 
type of insurance plan and a set percentage of an individual’s income.24 It varies 
this percentage based upon where a family’s income falls between 100 and 400 
percent of the poverty line. As families make more money, their expected contri-
bution to health insurance increases. The result is that the lowest-income individu-
als do not pay more than 2 percent of their income, while those at 400 percent of 
the poverty line do not pay more than 9.5 percent of their income. 
The table below shows the premium tax credit’s expectations for family income 
based upon their earnings relative to the federal poverty level.
TABLE 1
Share of family income for ACA tax credits
By percentage of the federal poverty level
Family income as a percentage  
of the federal poverty level
Percentage of family income  
paid for health care premiums 
(For the second-cheapest silver-level plan)
Starting income Ending income Starting premium Ending premium
0% 133% 2.01% 2.01%
133% 150% 3.02% 4.02%
150% 200% 4.02% 6.34%
200% 250% 6.34% 8.10%
250% 300% 8.10% 9.56%
300% 400% 9.56% 9.56%
Note: Tax credit calculations use a family’s modified adjusted gross income, a measure of annual earnings minus some deductions.
Source: Bernadette Fernandez, “Health Insurance Premium Credits in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2015” 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2015), p. 10, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43945.pdf.
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The use of income in the premium tax credits is similar to the idea behind the 
EFC in federal aid calculations, only it is binding. The amount of the subsidy 
still declines as income increases, just as Pell Grants phase out. But the differ-
ence is people who qualify for the credit know that as long as they can afford 
the out-of-pocket percentage of their income, they will be able to buy a plan. By 
contrast, even individuals who can afford their EFC have no guarantee that they 
can afford to pay for college. 
The premium tax credits also set goals for what a family’s contribution is sup-
posed to buy. The ACA created a classification system that grades health insurance 
plans as bronze, silver, gold, or platinum.25 A plan’s level is based upon its actuarial 
value—a measure of the share of health insurance expenses that are paid by the 
plan versus the participant on average.26 For example, a bronze plan is one with 
an actuarial value of 60 percent, meaning that participants are expected to cover 
about 40 percent of costs; the plan covers the rest. The other classifications rep-
resent increasingly generous options in which the participant pays a smaller share 
of costs. Silver, on average, covers 70 percent of a patient’s costs; gold covers 80 
percent; and platinum covers 90 percent.27 
While families receiving premium tax credits choose their plan level, the federal 
government guarantees affordability only to a certain level of coverage. The pre-
mium tax credit is attached to the cost of the second-cheapest silver plan available 
to the recipient. This means that a family that chooses that plan receives a tax 
credit equal to the difference between their family contribution and the cost of the 
premium. So if the monthly premium is $100 and their contribution is $30, then 
the premium credit will be $70. 
This connection of the tax credit to a good of a specific type is another key les-
son for higher education. By stating exactly what the credit must be able to buy, 
it guarantees everyone can buy a silver plan, while letting the amount a person 
actually gets from the federal government vary. In contrast, higher education 
benefits fix the amount a student can obtain—so people who are in identical 
circumstances receive the same amount of money—but float the value of what 
those funds can buy. In other words, two full-time maximum Pell Grant recipients 
would likely receive the same amount of money, but those dollars buy them very 
different percentages of their total education costs if one goes to a community col-
lege in California and the other goes to a public four-year institution in Vermont. 
Higher education 
benefits fix the 
amount a student 
can obtain— 
so people who 
are in identical 
circumstances 
receive the  
same amount  
of money—but 
float the value  
of what those  
funds can buy.
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Thinking about the tax credits in terms of the value of the good also allows plans to 
develop benefit structures in different ways. For example, one plan could get to a 70 
percent actuarial value through low coinsurance but high deductibles, while another 
could take the opposite approach. Nor are these values determined on an individual 
basis—they represent the general estimate of what a typical person would pay.28 This 
provides insurers with flexibility for how to manage toward a specific end value. 
In some ways, the actuarial value concept mirrors what states and institutions 
already do on college pricing. Some states aim for affordability through a so-called 
high cost, high aid model. In these cases, colleges charge a high sticker price but 
then provide generous grant aid to subsidize the price for lower-income students. 
In other places, the state may provide a lot of operating support to a college, allow-
ing it to charge a low upfront price. The end price paid by students could very well 
be the same; it is the path to that number that differs. 
How federal housing assistance calculates benefits
The concept of a strong connection between the benefit amounts and specific 
purchasing goals is also a key element of the federal rental assistance programs. 
These programs use a set of benchmarks that are based upon a family’s income 
and the price of housing in a given area. The local rental market sets the maxi-
mum subsidy a family can receive, ensuring that benefits are sufficient to afford 
housing but are not too high. Families’ incomes dictates their chances of quali-
fying for support and what they are expected to pay out of pocket. The number 
of people in the household entitles them to structures of a certain size. These 
straightforward rules help families clearly understand the level of support they 
are entitled to receive if they are able to get into the program while still allowing 
choice up to a reasonable point of affordability. 
The federal government administers several rental assistance programs that pro-
vide affordable housing to more than 5 million households in the United States.29 
The two largest of these programs are Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance 
and Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, or HCVs, which were created in 1974.30 
Combined, these two programs serve approximately 70 percent of all federal 
rental assistance recipients.31 
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Both Section 8 programs operate as voucher models in which the government 
provides financial support for individuals to rent privately owned and operated 
apartments. The big difference between the two is that project-based rental 
assistance programs subsidize specific rental apartments and buildings, while 
HCVs cover properties of the recipients’ choosing. Over time, tenant-based 
vouchers have become the preferred method of providing rental assistance and 
currently serve 2.1 million families—almost double the 1.2 million served by 
project-based rental assistance.32 
At the most basic level, HCVs provide support for families so they will be able to 
pay no more than 30 percent of their income toward rent. This benchmark is sup-
posed to guarantee that paying for a place to live does not overwhelm a family’s 
budget so they also can afford food, clothing, and other necessities. This serves the 
same purpose as the income percentage for the health care tax credits. It is also the 
same concept absent in the federal aid programs. 
The amount of a recipient’s HCV is based upon the actual costs of housing in a 
given area. Section 8 HCVs are capped at the fair market rent, or FMR—the typi-
cal average rent in the local housing market.33 In other words, the federal govern-
ment will not provide a voucher for an amount above the typical rent in an area. 
Tying benefits to rent in an area controls costs while providing a clear definition 
of what families pay. The vouchers also have standards for how large a structure a 
family can rent based upon its size and the ages of its members.34 
Though health care and housing are two very different markets, they both show 
the benefits of taking a more intentional approach to the benchmarks and levels 
set for federal assistance. By setting standards for the income percentage a family 
should pay for a product or service and guaranteeing that level of payment to be 
enough to afford a minimum product, these programs ensure that participants 
receive support that actually helps them buy what they need. This is distinct from 
the federal student aid programs, which appear to set affordability goals based 
upon income but simply distribute set amounts of dollars with no consideration 
for what those dollars can buy. 
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Lesson #2: The most vulnerable individuals  
have minimal to no out-of-pocket costs
Improving affordability for everyone is a laudable goal. But keeping expenses 
reasonable is even more important for the most at-risk individuals. Lower-income 
people have fewer resources to cope with high prices. Shocks such as sudden cost 
increases may be more likely to cause them to stop using a service. For example, 
they may drop out of college or go without health insurance. It is for these reasons 
that any affordability system must pay particular attention to how it serves the 
most vulnerable of its beneficiaries. 
Federal health benefits
One notable feature of the health insurance tax credits is that individuals must make 
at least 100 percent of the federal poverty level to receive assistance. This is not some 
conspiracy to exclude the poorest individuals. Rather, it reflects a theory of afford-
ability that recognizes that some people are so low income that demanding any kind 
of out-of-pocket contribution is infeasible. Instead, the expectation of the ACA is 
that the poorest people who fall below the poverty level will get a different form of 
coverage that is less expensive for them through the Medicaid program. 
The Medicaid program provides a different way to think about how to serve the 
lowest-income individuals. In higher education, the federal government supports 
the poorest students by giving them the largest amount of grant aid. It then hopes 
that states and institutions will support these individuals but does not actually 
require them to do so. Medicaid sets much more explicit assistance goals for who 
must be covered and what types of services they must receive. It then splits the 
costs of meeting these aims with the states. This creates a sense of shared responsi-
bility for helping the most at-risk individuals. 
Medicaid provides health care coverage to more than 71 million Americans.35 It was 
signed into law in July 1965, predating the Higher Education Act’s November sign-
ing by a few months.36 Medicaid operates as a federal-state partnership, in which the 
federal government reimburses states for a portion of funds spent. All states and the 
District of Columbia participate in Medicaid. In exchange for this federal assistance, 
states must provide at least a defined set of health care benefits to some specific 
populations. Beyond these parameters, states have significant flexibility both in 
terms of other benefits offered, groups covered, and even how to finance their share 
of expenses. As a result, Medicaid varies a great deal from state to state.
Any affordability 
system must pay 
particular attention 
to how it serves the 
most vulnerable of 
its beneficiaries.
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The federal government requires that states use Medicaid at a minimum to 
provide health care coverage to all individuals who meet certain qualifications. 
These groups have very specific definitions that are based on financial tests—such 
as being extremely low income—or individuals’ characteristics—such as being 
pregnant or disabled. At a significantly simplified level, Medicaid must cover indi-
viduals in several main categories: extremely low-income households, pregnant 
women and children age 18 and under living in low-income households, elderly 
people who are low-income, or those with significant long-term disabilities. 
The ACA, meanwhile, allowed states to expand coverage to everyone up to 138 
percent of the federal poverty level. Beyond those groups, states have discretion 
to provide services to other individuals, though in many cases they need a waiver 
from the federal government to do so.37 For example, states can choose to cover 
pregnant women with slightly higher incomes with a waiver.38 
Medicaid’s notion of extending benefits to the most vulnerable is not that dis-
similar from the Pell Grant. Both are targeted programs that direct support to 
people who have very minimal resources. In the case of Pell Grants, 72 percent of 
recipients come from households making $30,000 or less per year.39 For Medicaid, 
families qualify for the program if they are at or below 138 percent of the poverty 
level, which is equal to an annual income of about $33,465 for a family of four.40 
But Pell Grants and Medicaid also have several differences. For one, the Pell Grant 
program sets consistent benefit eligibility across the country—no state can be 
more or less generous with recipients because the rules for who can receive sup-
port are set by federal law. By contrast, states may choose to extend Medicaid eligi-
bility to additional individuals because they are sharing in the cost of the program. 
While this benefit expansion is a good thing, states may also choose to be less 
generous. This is particularly a problem in states that did not accept the Medicaid 
expansion, where coverage of adults without children is extremely low.41
Once individuals are eligible for Medicaid, they are guaranteed to receive 
certain benefits. For example, an individual participating in Medicaid must 
receive certain services, such as lab, X-ray, or inpatient hospital care.42 States 
can, however, choose the exact scope and duration of benefits as long as they do 
not limit the benefits so much that they would no longer be able to serve their 
intended purpose.43 States can also choose to cover certain optional benefits at 
their discretion if they wish to be more generous.44 
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The guaranteed benefits that come with Medicaid eligibility provide consumers 
with much more certainty than the federal student aid programs. Students who 
are eligible for a Pell Grant are not actually entitled to funding beyond the set 
dollar sum they receive. They are not guaranteed that they will be able to access or 
afford a college of a certain type or level of quality. 
Federal housing benefits
Federal rental assistance programs also build in concepts of greater generosity for the 
lowest-income individuals through their eligibility terms. For starters, a family must 
not earn more than 80 percent of the median income in their city or county to qual-
ify for aid. Income limits are determined for metropolitan areas and counties and 
are adjusted for family size.45 But because these programs are not entitlements—a 
low-income family is not guaranteed to receive support—they also target benefits 
further. For instance, project-based rental assistance requires that at least 40 percent 
of units in each development go to families who are extremely low-income—mean-
ing they make no more than 30 percent of the local median income.46 Tenant-based 
HCVs are even more targeted—extremely low-income families must receive 75 per-
cent of all new vouchers each year.47 While this need for greater targeting is mostly 
a reflection of the disappointing fact that not enough support is available for rental 
assistance, it does also show a similar commitment to providing as much generosity 
as possible to the lowest-income individuals.
Overall, both the health care and housing approaches to the most vulnerable pop-
ulations send a message that there are some levels of income so low that recipients 
cannot be expected to pay much, if anything. 
Lesson #3: There are limits to what the federal  
government will support for affordability
While the federal government has a vested interest in making certain goods and 
benefits affordable, it does not need to meet this goal for every type of a given 
product or service. Ensuring affordability for every type of insurance plan, hous-
ing structure, or institution of higher education would discourage efforts at cost 
containment and likely result in the federal government spending more money on 
expensive options with identical outcomes to cheaper alternatives. 
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Currently, the federal government does not really consider the question of what 
should be affordable or where it should limit assistance in its higher education 
assistance programs. On the first issue, the government uses the same formulas 
to determine students’ benefits regardless of whether they attend a higher- or 
lower-priced institution. It is, thus, equally willing to subsidize the country’s most 
expensive school as it is the cheapest. In fact, the aid awarding formulas are set so 
students cannot receive benefits above their level of expenses. This means someone 
who goes to an expensive college will receive more federal assistance, even though 
the dollar amounts may be able to purchase a smaller share of a college education.48 
By contrast, other sectors have very different approaches to affordability limits. 
In the case of health insurance tax credits, this means attaching benefits only to 
coverage of a certain level and not increasing support beyond that point. In the 
housing space, the federal government addresses this issue by setting limits on 
how much of its income a family can spend and still receive a subsidy. 
In the health care sector, the federal government sets its affordability limits in terms 
of how generous a plan it will guarantee someone can afford. To do this, it attaches 
the amount of the tax credit to the difference between the second-least expensive 
silver plan and a set percentage of a family’s income. Only for plans of this type and 
below does the federal government ensure that a set percentage of income will pur-
chase a defined level of benefits. A family can, however, choose a more expensive 
gold or platinum plan, paying a larger share of their income for premiums because 
their subsidy does not increase to reflect the higher plan’s cost. The credit by no 
means prevents such a choice, but it does provide a clear understanding that the 
government is not expected to guarantee affordability for those options.
Similar to health insurance tax credits, federal rental assistance programs attach 
their benefits to the median rent in an area to ensure housing options will be 
affordable. This too allows families to choose more expensive housing. But regula-
tions allow them to do this only to a point—families cannot pay more than a 
certain percentage of their income and still receive assistance. 
Federal rental assistance benefits provide families the difference between the 
fair market rent in their area for the size of house for which they qualify minus 
30 percent of their income. Families have the option to choose housing that 
costs more than the FMR, but then they pay the difference between the amount 
over the benchmark plus 30 percent of their income.49 For example, the FMR in 
Washington, D.C., for a family of four in a three-bedroom home is $1,951. That 
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is the maximum subsidy a family in the region could receive toward the cost of 
housing. If the family chooses housing that costs more than $1,951, the family 
would pay more toward rent. 
Families cannot, however, use vouchers for any housing above the FMR where 
they would pay more than 40 percent of their income in their first year of rent-
ing.50 This ensures families choose a home that is affordable for their income and 
that subsidies do not cover overly expensive homes. 
The concepts described above could apply to higher education in several ways. 
For instance, Congress could require that benefits be sufficient to afford a set 
percentage of the price of a public four-year college in each state. This would allow 
students who attend a community college to cover a larger percentage of their 
costs, while those who choose private colleges would not have any guarantees or 
expectations that their education would be affordable. Alternatively, affordability 
limitations could be applied to the debt levels so that institutions cannot load 
students with loans beyond a certain point of indebtedness relative to their future 
income. As the next lesson shows, this is just one way to tackle the question of 
affordability in a debt-based financing mechanism. 
Lesson #4: There are affordability standards for debt 
The federal government often helps individuals afford products and services 
with debt financing. In the case of higher education, it provides students with 
low-cost loans that are repaid to the government. For housing, the government 
provides insurance to encourage companies to issue mortgages and sets stan-
dards to protect borrowers from some of the unscrupulous behavior observed 
during the Great Recession. 
The federal government must be very careful when it provides access to debt. 
While leverage can help individuals access a home or an education that they might 
not otherwise be able to afford, it also adds risks. This is not a problem if these 
individuals easily repay their loans, but it matters a lot if they fall behind or default, 
which can have disastrous financial consequences. 
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Federal higher education debt
In higher education, the government limits access to loans strictly in dollar terms. 
For undergraduate borrowers, it sets annual and lifetime loan limits based on 
a student’s year in school. These cumulative limits are $31,000 for dependent 
students and $57,500 for independent students.51 Meanwhile, both graduate and 
parent borrowers have largely unlimited access to debt. As long as they can pass 
a minimal consideration of past credit history, they are allowed to borrow any 
amount up to an institution’s cost of attendance. 
How federally guaranteed mortgages approach indebtedness
The housing sector takes a much different approach to debt. While it too has 
dollar-based limits, the housing sector also sets affordability standards in terms 
of debt relative to income in order to protect borrowers from ending up with 
mortgages they are unlikely to repay. Neither of these steps prevents someone 
from finding a loan that appears unaffordable, but it limits how much the federal 
government will become involved in mortgages that appear to be overly risky.
The Federal Housing Administration, or FHA, is the best example of how the 
federal government approaches affordability in other debt programs. Congress 
created the FHA in 1934 after the Great Depression. Its goal is to improve housing 
standards, provide an adequate home financing system through insured home 
mortgage loans, and stabilize the housing market.52 When FHA was created, 
only 40 percent of households could afford to own their home.53 The majority of 
families could not meet the strict mortgage loan terms: down payments equal to 
50 percent of the property’s market value and repayment schedules of only three 
to five years ending with a balloon payment.54 
The FHA attempts to increase homeownership by providing insurance for 
private lenders to issue mortgages. The insurance provides private lenders 
with full protection against losses if a buyer defaults on a loan. In most cases, 
if a borrower defaults, the FHA pays the lender the remaining principal owed. 
Because the government provides insurance and lessens the risk to private lend-
ers, lenders can offer loans with more accessible terms to buyers who would not 
otherwise qualify. Since its start, the program has insured more than 34 million 
homes, allowing the United States to achieve a homeownership rate of 68 per-
cent—one of the highest rates in the world.55 Today, approximately 4.8 million 
single-family mortgages are FHA insured.56 
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What makes FHA mortgages interesting from an affordability standpoint is they 
are capped in absolute terms and relative to a buyer’s income. The exact amount 
that can be lent varies by locality but has a national ceiling that cannot be sur-
passed. For high-cost areas such as Washington, D.C., the cap is at the national 
maximum of $625,500; for the lowest-cost areas, the cap is $271,050.57 In addi-
tion to these maximum limits, the FHA also limits mortgage sizes based upon the 
family’s debt-to-income ratio. This test looks at all debt—not only the mortgage 
amount. In general, FHA will not allow a mortgage in which payments exceed 31 
percent of a family’s income or where the combination of the mortgage and other 
debt exceeds 43 percent of income.58 
The higher education market recently incorporated a similar concept of debt-to-
earnings rates for loan eligibility through a regulation known as gainful employment. 
Issued by the U.S. Department of Education in 2014, it requires career-oriented 
programs to ensure that graduates who received federal aid have debt payments 
that are equal to or less than 8 percent of their annual income. Programs that can-
not maintain this threshold risk losing access to federal student aid. The difference 
between gainful employment and the FHA’s mortgage process, however, is that gain-
ful employment looks at the results after the fact to ensure debts were not too high, 
while the FHA simply would not have insured the loan at the outset. 
Even outside of the gainful employment context, the upfront affordability require-
ments considered by the FHA could be implemented in two other ways in the 
student loan programs. First, affordability benchmarks could be used to establish 
risk-sharing requirements, in which colleges would be on the hook for a larger 
share of unaffordable debt burdens that become delinquent, default, or are not 
repaid. Second, for parents who take out federal loans, affordability requirements 
could be similar to those used for housing—parents would be unable to borrow 
amounts for which their monthly payments would be greater than a certain share 
of their income. Regardless of structure, adding these requirements would allow 
students and parents to acquire some debt, while preventing colleges from bur-
dening them with too much debt without sharing the risk. 
Importantly, limitations on debt based upon the student would not work in higher 
education. The undergraduate loan limits already serve as a good check on prevent-
ing egregious debt levels in absolute terms. In addition, most students lack the credit 
or income history to gauge proper limits. Unlike a mortgage, where the purchaser’s 
income is likely to stay constant or grow at a relatively stable rate, someone who gets 
a good college education should expect to see fairly steep income increases in the 
years after graduation. The result is that the maximum amount of reasonable debt 
upfront may end up being easily repaid after a few years in the workplace. 
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Mortgage affordability after the financial crisis 
Additional new rules relating to mortgages provide another way to add affordabil-
ity protections to student loans. These rules establish a qualified mortgage, which 
encourages lenders to offer loans with certain protections and reasonable terms. 
The idea arose from the mortgage crisis, when it became clear lenders did not bear 
enough responsibility for offering unaffordable loans to homebuyers. To address 
this issue, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in 2008. The bill required all creditors to make a reasonable, good-
faith determination of a consumer’s ability to repay a homeowners’ mortgage. 
In 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a rule further imple-
menting ability-to-repay requirements and established the concept of a qualified 
mortgage.59 The basic idea is to create greater legal protections for lenders that 
offer affordable products without undesirable features, while raising the risk for 
companies whose loans do not meet these terms.
The most important requirement for a loan to be a qualified mortgage is that it 
takes into consideration a buyer’s ability to repay the loan.60 This analysis must 
consider not only the cost of the mortgage but also other debts a buyer holds. To 
be a qualified mortgage, the payments on the loan plus other debts cannot exceed 
43 percent of the buyer’s pretax income.61 This provision discourages lenders from 
offering excessive amounts of debt to people who likely cannot afford them. In 
addition, the loan itself cannot have risky features associated with deceptive prac-
tices, such as temporarily low interest rates that will rise over time, hidden fees, or 
mandatory arbitration clauses.62
Whether a lender offers a qualifying mortgage matters for how a court assesses 
a company’s compliance with ability-to-pay standards. Offering a qualified 
mortgage gives a lender some protection against consumer lawsuits that allege 
the lender violated ability-to-repay requirements. Lenders that offer low-cost 
qualified mortgages have a safe harbor. This means that in the case of a lawsuit, 
the court presumes the lender has complied with ability-to-repay-requirements, 
providing the lender with greater leverage in the case.63 This does not mean that 
lenders cannot issue nonqualified mortgages, but it does provide an encourage-
ment for offering these debts. 
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Applying the concept of qualified mortgages to student loans has interesting 
implications for higher education affordability. In 2013, the Center for American 
Progress discussed this issue in the context of private student loans.64 But the 
idea could work for colleges, as well. For example, the federal government could 
establish rules that affect how much risk an institution has to bear based upon the 
amount of debt it offers certain students or the ratio of student debt to postcollege 
income. Schools that stay below a set threshold would have to share in little to no 
risk, while those above the benchmark would bear more risk. The basic idea would 
be the same—institutions that do well by students on specific clear metrics would 
have greater protections than those for whom excessive debt is the norm. 
Lesson #5: Make affordability a shared goal
The federal student aid programs are unilateral investments. The federal govern-
ment covers the entire cost of the benefits it provides to students via institutions. 
Operationally, this makes the programs easier to administer because they do not 
require relationships in every single state. It also ensures that students receive 
equitable benefits regardless of where they live.
A unilateral approach to higher education affordability also has significant draw-
backs for the federal government. In particular, it means the federal government 
cannot leverage partnerships with states and institutions to make them do their 
part in keeping costs down. Instead, when states and institutions cut their own 
funding, the federal government steps in as a safety net for students. The addi-
tional grants and loans the government provided when states aggressively slashed 
funding during the Great Recession helped millions of students afford education 
that would otherwise likely have been too costly. Unfortunately, by placing no 
requirements on the states and institutions that also benefit from federal aid, the 
government puts itself in a position in which its programs can be taken advantage 
of, allowing states and schools to supplant their own funding. When this occurs, 
the costs of subsidizing higher education directly transfer from the state and insti-
tution to the student and the federal government. 
To be clear, the issue at stake here is distinct from the argument that some make 
about how federal student aid directly leads to tuition increases. That theory, 
known as the Bennett Hypothesis, alleges that institutions intentionally raise prices 
as a way of capturing increases in financial aid revenue.65 This formulation is a mis-
understanding of the dynamics behind higher education funding. For one, federal 
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student aid has not risen nearly as much as tuition. Undergraduate federal student 
loan limits have not increased since 2008. And before that, they had not changed 
since 1994 for anyone other than first-year students.66 The Pell Grant does increase 
each year by a few dozen dollars, but this is far below the annual rise in tuition and 
is not available for all students. While higher education tax benefits also increased 
by about $700 since 2008, this is still well below the rise in tuitions.67 
Rather, the issue at play is a question of who should be responsible for subsidiz-
ing public higher education. For decades, the answer to this question was the 
states, with the federal government providing some support for the lowest-income 
students, and everyone else paid out of pocket. While state subsidies still exist 
today, they are significantly diminished. In many ways, this is the same pattern 
that repeats itself elsewhere in the social safety net, where states have decimated 
funding for goods and services such as support for low-income families.68 In the 
case of higher education, however, the federal government has done more to assist 
students and fill the gap created by declines in state funding. The end result of this 
is a cost shift away from states and toward students and the federal government. 
Thus, rather than being the engine of state cuts, federal student aid has become the 
safety net that so many other parts of the social benefit structure lack. 
While having the federal government fill in the funding gaps left by state cuts is 
not ideal, it is particularly problematic in higher education because much of the 
backfilling is done with debt. Paying for college with loans raises the long-term 
price of college for students since they must repay what they borrow plus interest. 
Debt also increases the risk to attempt college. If students do not complete college 
or attend a poor-quality program, they may not receive the income gains necessary 
to make the loan proposition work. For these people, debt can become unmanage-
able, leading to default and dire financial consequences such as wage garnishment. 
Fortunately, the significant size of the federal investments in postsecondary educa-
tion presents an opportunity to change these dynamics. Moving away from federal 
financial aid as a unilateral investment and toward a system that creates shared 
requirements between states, institutions, and the federal government presents 
the best opportunity for guaranteeing postsecondary affordability. Rather than 
treating financial aid as a price driver, policymakers need to recognize its place as 
the nation’s single best tool for keeping costs reasonable. 
There are several ways the federal government could use its financial aid programs 
to play a more active role in affordability. In particular, two examples from the 
health care coverage and insurance space stand out: Medicaid and the employer 
mandate from the ACA. 
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Shared affordability through Medicaid 
As noted earlier, states that participate in Medicaid are required to cover certain 
populations and share in the expense of coverage. The way this cost sharing actu-
ally works is as an open-ended reimbursement program. The state spends money 
on allowable Medicaid expenses, and then the federal government reimburses part 
of the cost. Importantly, there is no hard cap on spending. States that are willing 
to expand their eligibility and thus provide better benefits to more people receive 
additional federal support to make it workable. 
A state’s reimbursement rate under Medicaid is dictated primarily by the Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage, or FMAP, rate, though additional formulas may 
apply under certain exceptions.69 The FMAP formula takes into account the 
relationship between a given state’s per-capita income and national per-capita 
income.70 By law, the FMAP cannot be lower than 50 percent—meaning that 
the federal government evenly shares the cost of every expense with a state—or 
higher than 83 percent—meaning that for every $1 the state spends, it gets all 
but 17 cents back.71 Mississippi had the highest FMAP rate in 2015 at 73.58 
percent, while 13 states had a rate of 50 percent.72
The FMAP structure shows a way to share the costs of affordability across states 
that have radically different levels of affluence. Rather than holding every state 
to identical standards, the varying reimbursement rate allows the federal govern-
ment to pick up a larger share of the costs for states that cannot afford to pay, while 
providing less assistance to those with more wealth. This is essentially the same 
way the federal government approaches benefits for individuals, with the amount 
of help declining as wealth rises. 
The payment structures for Medicaid and federal higher education benefits cre-
ate very different incentives. By reimbursing states for costs incurred, Medicaid 
encourages states to be more generous, but it also makes them share the burden 
of additional costs as a way of discouraging overly profligate spending. This type 
of funding model could be one way to get states to reinvest in higher education. It 
bears some similarity to an idea suggested by the American Association of State 
Colleges and Universities, which would create a new federal funding stream that 
rewards states with additional dollars, depending on how much they spend on a 
per-student basis.73 As states spend more, they would receive additional dollars, 
creating a similar incentive for greater generosity. 
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It is possible to incorporate similar principles from the Medicaid program into 
federal student aid even without a new funding stream. Congress could change the 
programs to introduce a more formal role and set of expectations for states. Under 
this structure, states would have to commit to making higher education affordable 
for Pell Grant recipients and share in the cost of doing so. Similar to Medicaid, this 
structure would require states to focus efforts on supporting the lowest-income 
recipients through a shared funding model. 
While the Medicaid model represents a collaborative approach to tackling afford-
ability through increased funding, other health care examples suggest ways to 
address the same challenge with accountability. This would be particularly effective 
for thinking of ways to make institutions play a greater role in offering affordable 
products. Recognizing that not all schools have their own aid to use or set their own 
tuition, starting accountability with colleges could also be a way to spur state action. 
ACA’s employer mandate
The ACA’s employer requirements for health insurance coverage provide an 
example of how accountability can create shared affordability. Basically, the ACA 
requires employers bigger than a certain size to offer employees coverage of a 
minimum benefit and cost level. These conditions apply only to companies that 
employ the equivalent of 50 or more full-time employees.74 
The shared responsibility provisions serve as a way to hold larger employers mon-
etarily accountable for not offering acceptable health care coverage. To avoid these 
penalties, an employer’s plan must provide minimum essential coverage, at least 60 
percent of benefit costs.75 Employers must also offer coverage to at least 95 percent 
of their full-time employees and ensure the premiums do not exceed 9.5 percent of 
an employee’s annual income.76 Meeting these conditions is important—the penal-
ties are triggered if even one full-time employee receives a premium tax credit.77 
This framework establishes a strong message that employers have a responsibility 
to keep their coverage affordable and their employees off the individual market. 
Failure to do so can have significant financial consequences. Employers that do 
not offer coverage to enough employees are assessed a penalty equal to $2,000 
multiplied by their number of full-time employees. Additionally, if an employer 
offers unaffordable coverage that results in an employee receiving a premium tax 
credit, the fine increases to $3,000 per person. These fines are not based on the 
number of employees getting a credit or not getting coverage; rather, a single unac-
ceptable instance results in a cost based upon all full-time employees.78 
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The requirements for employers to provide insurance coverage can be applied to 
accountability for colleges. Institutions that lead students into unaffordable levels 
of debt are failing in their responsibilities the same way employers with unac-
ceptable insurance coverage do. But instead of fining colleges, institutions with 
unaffordable debt levels could be prohibited from participating in the federal aid 
programs or required to share in more of the risk when borrowers with excessive 
loan balances struggle. The former case would be similar to expanding the existing 
gainful employment regulation that holds career training programs accountable 
for the debts of graduates versus their earnings. In the latter, it would mean that 
the more unaffordable the debt levels become, the more an institution would pay 
to the federal government each time a borrower struggles. 
The benefit of the risk-sharing approach is that institutions would have to contrib-
ute funds only if elevated debt levels became problematic. This protects institu-
tions with good outcomes from facing sanctions while sending a strong signal 
about the connection between debt and performance. An initial focus on perfor-
mance also means penalties could be intensified over time. 
In establishing a risk-sharing system, the federal government should consider 
the choices about differentiated accountability that are present in the ACA. For 
instance, a risk-sharing system should draw distinctions in requirements based 
upon the size of the institution, including the number of borrowers and amount of 
debt received. This protects the smallest institutions because it may not be feasible 
to expect from them the same results as large universities. 
Regardless of whether through a reimbursement-style reward or risk-sharing 
accountability, the lessons from health care demonstrate one strong lesson: 
Affordability is too complex a problem to rely solely on solutions from the 
federal government. It will be impossible to lower prices, increase value, and 
keep debt levels in check without creating incentives for everyone involved in 
affecting those results. 
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Potential downsides of affordability
The lessons illustrate five useful strategies for tackling higher education affordabil-
ity. This includes relying on clear benchmarks for determining how much assis-
tance to provide and creating shared responsibility for keeping benefits in reach. 
This does not, however, mean every social support program from other sectors has 
a perfect structure that should be adopted in federal aid programs. In fact, looking 
closely at other programs raises several concerns that must be thought through 
before making changes in the student programs: ensuring benefit levels and fund-
ing are sufficient to avoid rationing, addressing all costs that might be barriers to 
affordability, requiring family contributions that recipients believe are manage-
able, and acknowledging that supporting only products and services that meet 
certain requirements can be difficult if they change over time. 
Concern #1: Unavailability undermines affordability 
Achieving affordability is not just about providing sufficient benefits for an 
individual—it requires providing sufficient support for everyone who needs it. 
Not assisting enough qualified individuals can undermine the goals of a program 
because it means recipients will not be certain of getting the help they need. 
The Pell Grant fares extremely well in terms of availability. Any student who 
applies for aid and meets the eligibility terms is guaranteed to receive support. 
This is true whether the student is the first or the 8,000,000th person to apply. 
This dependability is crucial for building trust in the program and convincing 
young families they will receive help paying for college. 
This concern of availability within affordability also relates to where recipients can 
actually use their benefits. For instance, a program that covers all eligible individuals 
but lets them participate only at sites that are geographically distant is not really an 
affordable program. After all, lower-income individuals may not be able to afford the 
time and money needed to get to the places where their benefits are accepted. 
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The issue of local availability is a particular concern in the Medicaid program. 
While Medicaid requires states to provide recipients some freedom to choose 
among different health care providers, beneficiaries can have trouble finding a 
doctor or dentist willing to serve them.79 Being unable to actually use Medicaid 
benefits can weaken its goal of keeping individuals and families healthy. 
The federal aid programs, however, excel at having options for students. 
Financial aid can be used at any of the more than 7,000 participating colleges, 
as long as the institution accepts the student.80 Recipients can use their benefits 
to attend colleges in other states, whereas Medicaid covers costs in other states 
only under certain circumstances.81 
That said, the actual ability of students to choose among many institutions may 
be overstated. In general, poorer students are much more likely to choose higher 
education institutions close to their home, especially if they attend a commu-
nity college.82 Similarly, adult or working students who already have established 
professional or family lives are unlikely to pursue postsecondary options that 
are far away. And even setting aside geographic concerns, institutions that cost 
more than the available benefits may be so out of reach that they are not actually 
a viable college choice.
In other cases, federal benefit programs may not be funded well enough that 
they are guaranteed to be available for everyone who needs them. This is par-
ticularly an issue in the federal rental assistance programs. It is not uncommon 
for a family to spend months and even years on a waitlist before receiving help 
through these programs. While federal rental assistance subsidies currently help 
more than 5 million households, it is estimated that figure represents only 25 
percent of those who could be eligible for such help.83 Once families get off the 
waitlist, the housing where they can use their benefits may not be in neighbor-
hoods that are best for children.84 
Problems with rental assistance availability will likely continue to get worse as 
demand for low-income housing has grown while funding for these programs 
has stalled in recent years.85 Budget cuts stemming from sequestration in 2013 
resulted in millions of fewer dollars available for low-income housing pro-
grams and a reduction in the number of families assisted by the program. While 
Congress restored some of the funding in 2014, the program still does not have 
enough money to provide for all families that need affordable housing.86 
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All of this suggests that any rethinking of affordability benefits needs to strike 
a balance between robust choice for the beneficiary and sufficiency to achieve 
its intended aims. The rental assistance programs have clear goals to make sure 
benefits are sufficient but do not pay enough attention to choice and widespread 
availability. Medicaid falls in the middle, with some thought paid to choice but 
gaps that need to be filled. In the case of federal student aid, there is, arguably, too 
large a focus entirely on choice with no consideration of sufficiency. While there 
is not necessarily a perfect answer to these challenges, they need greater consider-
ation in the federal aid programs. 
Concern #2: Affordability has multiple elements 
Most discussions about college affordability are actually focused on the price 
students must pay an institution to attend. But looking at only these direct 
costs misses a big portion of the affordability challenge. Consider, for example, 
California community colleges: These institutions are essentially free for most 
students.87 But the students who go there still must find ways to cover their hous-
ing, transportation, food, and possibly child care to attend. These are thousands 
of dollars in costs and cannot be ignored. After all, students who cannot pay to fix 
the broken car on which they rely to get to school may be at just as high a risk of 
dropping out as students who struggle academically. 
The federal student aid programs partially consider the additional costs that must 
be covered to make college affordable. On the positive side, federal benefits can 
be used to pay for nondirect expenses, such as living costs. This allows students 
who attend a less expensive college to potentially receive more assistance covering 
these necessities. At the same time, because federal college benefits are not con-
nected to any affordability metric, there is no guarantee a student’s institution will 
be cheap enough to have money left over for living. As a result, students’ ability to 
afford all expenses associated with an educational program varies a great deal by 
where they happen to live and study. 
The costs of using health insurance 
The challenge of addressing affordability beyond the direct cost of the item pur-
chased is particularly present in the health care context. In this area, the issue is that 
the monthly premiums are just one health-related cost consumers must manage. 
In the case of 
federal student  
aid, there is, 
arguably, too  
large a focus 
entirely on  
choice with  
no consideration  
of sufficiency.
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Out-of-pocket spending for prescriptions or copays for doctor visits also need to be 
affordable because any plan for which someone can afford the premiums but not the 
per-visit costs proves to be insufficient for care except catastrophic incidents. 
The ACA tried to address these additional affordability challenges through two 
provisions. First, it capped the out-of-pocket cost to consumers on the ACA 
exchange to $6,450 per year for services covered by their plan; the family cap is 
$12,900.88 Families that make between 100 percent and 250 percent of the pov-
erty level have an even lower cap of $2,250 to $5,200.89 
The second provision gave additional subsidies to increase the actuarial value of 
silver plans for low-income people. It does this by increasing the actuarial value so 
that the lowest-income individuals will, on average, pay even less than 30 per-
cent of costs. Someone between 100 and 150 percent of the poverty level cannot 
be charged an actuarial value for a silver plan below 94 percent—meaning the 
individual is responsible for 6 percent of costs. Families with incomes between 
150 percent and 200 percent of the poverty level are guaranteed an actuarial value 
of 87 percent, while those between 200 percent and 250 percent are promised 73 
percent.90 These requirements provide a way to further decrease other health care 
costs, such as deductibles, coinsurance, or other payments. 
These cost-sharing requirements also have implications for choice. They nudge 
families to pick silver plans because those who choose less generous options—
such as a bronze plan—or top-tier options—such as a platinum plan—do not get 
the increase in actuarial value. This change does not restrict choice, but it provides 
greater guidance for individuals who may be unsure which plan to choose. This 
setup also involves danger. A family that does not understand the nudge may end 
up making a significant mistake, choosing to pay a bit less each month for a bronze 
plan even though the reduced cost sharing of a silver plan more than offsets the 
difference in premiums. 
In Medicaid, the process of dealing with additional costs is more straightforward. 
Under program rules, only higher-income Medicaid participants can be charged 
monthly premiums.91 And while states can charge participants when they access 
health care in the form of copayments, deductibles, etc., these amounts must be 
kept small, with poorer individuals charged less. Overall, the participants’ share of 
costs must generally stay below 5 percent of their income.92
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Making nonacademic costs affordable in higher education is one of the most 
vexing problems facing the sector today. It is increasingly suggested that living 
costs cannot be ignored when trying to address college affordability and comple-
tion. But living costs are also quite high, and expanding benefits to cover all of 
these expenses would be unaffordable. Greater standardization or consistency in 
estimating the size of these costs would be a good first step. Currently, colleges 
can set their own estimates of living expenses, resulting in a lot of inconsistency: 
Colleges located near each other have come up with radically different numbers.93 
Taking a more rational and consistent approach to these costs would at least start 
the process of understanding what kind of gaps need to be filled and the possible 
strategies for addressing them. 
Concern #3: Spending requirements  
for families must feel affordable
Establishing affordability benchmarks is important for giving families a sense of 
certainty about what they will have to pay. If, however, these thresholds are set too 
high, they seem so unaffordable that the certainty value is lost. 
A potential example of this problem already exists in the federal student loan 
programs. Right now, struggling borrowers are able to reduce their loan payments 
to no more than 10 percent of their discretionary income. As a percentage of their 
overall income, this proportion is much lower. This is because discretionary earn-
ings represent an individual’s income minus estimates of necessary expenses such 
as housing and food. But if borrowers do not understand the concept of discre-
tionary income, then 10 percent may feel far too high as a repayment expectation. 
Similarly, if the amount of money a family is expected to pay out of pocket is too 
high, then a guarantee may not feel generous enough to be meaningful. Consider, 
for example, a family that makes 300 percent of the poverty level and receives an 
ACA tax credit. Paying a little more than 9.5 percent of the family income may 
seem affordable in the abstract, but if that family has a lot of additional debt, then 
it may not be a low enough figure to be workable. 
The challenge of setting thresholds that seem affordable is further complicated by 
the fact that many of the numbers chosen are the result of political calculations of 
what Congress can afford based on available funds. This means a given benchmark 
may be less a reflection of an objectively determined number and more a reality of 
the lowest that could be agreed upon. 
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All of this means that any approach to threshold setting in higher education must 
strive to find clear numbers based upon objective assessments of what families can 
pay. Missing the mark can weaken the effectiveness of any new benchmarks. 
Concern #4: What meets affordability standards can change
Setting affordability goals through benchmarks and subsidizing options that meet 
certain conditions is one way to ensure that federal programs meet their intended 
goals. But one challenge with such an approach is that options are not static—a 
provider that meets the benchmarks today might change and no longer meet the 
benchmark tomorrow. For instance, a college that was affordable may raise its 
prices, or a high-quality program may get a new owner and not perform as well. 
Making it possible for the options that qualify under certain affordability stan-
dards to change can be good for products and services that need to be bought 
every year, such as health insurance. In health care, because plan premiums gener-
ally change annually, there is no guarantee the previous year’s second-lowest-cost 
silver plan will hold the same position the following year. The positive result is that 
consumers are encouraged to continue shopping for affordable coverage, which 
encourages greater competition and—it is hoped—better products for consum-
ers. On the downside, switching plans could be inconvenient if the plans have 
different networks of doctors and hospitals. 
Efforts at higher education affordability would do well to avoid this problem of 
changing eligibility if at all possible. Students attend college only for a few years, 
and transferring can result in lost academic credits or other adjustments that 
make it difficult to graduate on time. Given these considerations, the benefits of 
comparison shopping that come from changing what is eligible are more than 
outweighed by the costs of transferring. Because of this, the best way to handle 
changes in eligibility over time is by applying them only to new students. Doing so 
allows students to stick with their chosen school until they finish their education. 
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Recommendations
The federal investment in higher education is designed to correct a failure in 
the market. Without government support, millions of low- and middle-income 
families across the country would be unable to access and afford a postsecondary 
education. The result would be lower levels of educational attainment, a less-
skilled workforce, and depressed economic growth. 
At the same time, the government cannot ignore the return on its investments. As 
stewards of taxpayer dollars, it has a fiduciary responsibility to make sure money is 
well spent and achieves its desired aims. It cannot simply spend an infinite amount 
of money to fix the market failure in higher education. 
Unfortunately, the current construction of the federal aid system is insufficiently 
concerned with what its dollars buy and how states and institutions use them. 
As a result, it becomes far too easy for the purchasing power of federal grants 
and loans to be diminished by unabated tuition increases brought on by reduc-
tions in state funding. 
To fix these problems, the federal government should build upon the strategies 
already developed to tackle these same challenges in other key areas. In particular, 
it should do the following:
Create a guarantee of no- or low-cost  
public education for Pell Grant recipients 
Pell Grant recipients are the lowest-income individuals in higher education. 
They simply cannot afford to be charged thousands of dollars for college and 
shoulder massive debt burdens. Yet the current Pell Grant program contains no 
protections to ensure that even the absolute poorest individuals—those receiv-
ing the maximum award—have an expectation that the colleges enrolling them 
will charge a reasonable price. That needs to change. Much like the federal health 
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care benefits system sets standards for what low-income recipients can pay out 
of pocket, the Pell Grant program should establish similar requirements. This 
should start with guaranteeing Pell Grant recipients can use their funds to pur-
chase a public in-state education for an amount that is equal or close to free. 
Create purchasing guarantees for middle-income students
Just because someone is not a Pell Grant recipient does not mean they should 
lose any sort of guarantee about affordability. For these individuals, their guaran-
tee should be framed in terms of knowing that a reasonable family contribution 
coupled with small loans will be sufficient to cover the entire cost of an in-state 
public education. Such a system mirrors the structure of the ACA tax credits—
middle-income individuals are still expected to contribute out of pocket, but they 
know that contribution will be enough to buy what they need. 
Require states to meet affordability targets
The two recommendations above will work only if states do their part to keep the 
gaps that federal aid fills at a reasonable size. Doing so means setting expectations 
that are tied, not to per-pupil spending amounts, but to the back-end price faced 
by students after subtracting other forms of nonfederal financial aid and the family 
contribution. This approach gives states many paths to meeting the goal. They 
could increase operating support to keep tuition low; raise financial aid to target 
subsidies to lower-income students; pursue innovative strategies that reduce the 
expense of providing an education; or some combination of these approaches. 
These requirements would be conceptually similar to the state relationship in 
Medicaid, in which participating states would have to meet minimum expecta-
tions for which students receive what kinds of assistance, with flexibility for states 
to be more generous if they desire. 
Hold colleges accountable for excessive loan burdens
Both the health care and housing sectors recognize the risk of high prices and/or 
debt and take steps to mitigate those challenges. In health care, this means establish-
ing penalties for large employers that provide insufficient coverage. In housing, it 
means not providing subsidies for properties that would be too expensive relative to 
a recipient’s income or holding lenders accountable for offering unaffordable loans. 
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Higher education would benefit from embracing similar concepts. Colleges that 
regularly ask their students to take on unreasonable debt burdens—as measured 
relative to some expectation of economic return—should no longer continue to 
do so with impunity. Rather, those whose debt is out of control should face greater 
risks for their actions. This could take the form of making colleges with higher debt 
burdens be accountable for a larger portion of loans that perform poorly or revoking 
the right to offer loans for some or all programs at a school where debt gets too high. 
36 Center for American Progress | The Case for Federal Higher Education Affordability Standards
Conclusion
Federal higher education benefits are crucial investments for securing the coun-
try’s future economic competitiveness. But for far too many students, the financial 
aid programs fail to meet their goal of making college more affordable. 
An in-depth review of other federal benefit programs in health care and housing 
provides valuable lessons for rethinking higher education benefits. These pro-
grams are structured in a way that guarantees that money provided to individu-
als will be enough to meet costs. But they also hold other parties accountable to 
ensure recipients are not being charged more than they can actually afford. 
As detailed in this report, there are several options policymakers could take to 
ensure that investments guarantee affordability, simplicity, and certainty for stu-
dents and families. To accomplish this goal, an affordability guarantee must create 
clear expectations that financial aid dollars will cover the cost of college, that states 
cannot continue to pull money away from public colleges, and that institutions will 
be held accountable for high tuition and burdening students with too much debt.
In order to achieve their true aim and full potential, it is time for federal higher 
education benefits to not just be denominated in dollars but instead guarantee 
affordability and access for the most vulnerable individuals. 
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